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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: TAHA ASKS NATSIOS FOR HELP WITH NON-SIGNATORIES

Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Michael Honigstein, Reason: Section 1.4
(b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY. The only way to reinforce the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is by getting acceptance from non-signatories, Vice President Ali Osman Taha told Special Presidential Envoy (SPE) Andrew Natsios on October 15. Natsios underlined the importance of improving the humanitarian situation, maintaining security with a credible force, establishing a ceasefire, and beginning the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. Taha agreed that there was no military solution, but explained that diplomacy must come first, or the ceasefire would not last. Natsios also warned that if the Sudanese broke their agreement and barred him from travel to Juba and Darfur, he would leave immediately.
END SUMMARY.

Natsios: Humanitarian situation Must Improve, UN Can Help

12. (C) SPE Natsios began by telling VP Taha that he had no ultimatums to deliver and wanted to have a real dialogue. Natsios pointed out that bilateral relations could get worse because all sides in the U.S., from the far right to the far left, were unanimous on Darfur. However, Natsios said a conversation on what international forces were acceptable-- size, composition, mandate, structure, and funding-- is necessary. Natsios outlined the U.S.'s long-term goals, including acceptance of transition to the UN, but right now the emphasis is on a ceasefire and protection of non-combatants. Natsios said that he is concerned that the Janjaweed could start massacres in the camps if the chaos continued, and emphasized that the UN is good at this type of stabilization and disarmament mission and could really help the government.

Taha: Ceasefire will only work if non-Signatories Join DPA

13. (C) Taha agreed that protecting civilians was the priority, but said efforts to get the non-signatories into the DPA must be done first, or else a ceasefire would only help the rebels regroup. Natsios responded that negotiations are difficult during an offensive, but Taha reemphasized that security comes from diplomacy and not the other way around. Even if the UN came, Taha said, it could not maintain security without a political resolution.

14. (C) Taha pointed out that bilateral relations were good in Abuja, and that we should go back to that. Taha said the DPA failed because the U.S. and the Europeans abandoned the agreement immediately after signature, welcoming non-signatories, not condemning the attack in Kordofan, and

shifting all blame to the GoS. He also said he was disappointed there was no offer of help with compensation. The Dafurian concept of compensation, Natsios said, meant it had to come from the government. Natsios then added that there may be room to increase development aid and allow the GoS to shift more money to compensation.

¶5. (C) Taha said that many non-signatories, like Abdel Wahid al Nur, were respecting the ceasefire and did not present as urgent a problem as the National Redemption Front (NRF). Taha agreed to develop a plan for the U.S. and Sudan to work together on recruiting non-signatories, which could be discussed this week. Charge D'Affairs Hume added that it was important in planning to distinguish between non-signatories who respect the ceasefire and those that don't, but in the current chaotic environment that was impossible. Hume suggested the GoS consider a plan to begin a ceasefire in South Darfur, where there are fewer spoilers, which would be more manageable.

¶6. (C) COMMENT: In a one-on-one at the end of the meeting, Natsios warned Taha that the mood in western capitals, particularly Washington, was growing more impatient and that if non-combatants were massacred in the camps, that would provoke a serious response from the United States. Natsios was disappointed by Taha's lack of candor in the meeting and fixation on a revisionist description of the past. END COMMENT.

¶7. (U) Special Presidential Envoy Andrew Natsios has cleared this cable.
HUME